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Despite the erudition and braininess displayed in much
constitutional scholarship, an embarrassing and unpleasant
possibility lurks in the background like a crazy relative in the
attic. This possibility is that, as a general matter, modem
academic commentary on constitutional law is not really an
intellectual activity. I do not mean that this commentary is,
because of its adversarial qualities, a somewhat defective form of
scholarship. I mean that those qualities-the mischaracteriza-
tions of opposing positions, the argumentative (and sometimes
dishonest) uses of history, the shallow doctrinal manipulations,
the political partisanship, the exaggeration, and the name-
calling-may constitute the primary rules of the game. To the
extent that this is so, our work is essentially an exercise, not in
the evaluation of ideas, but in will-power.
Even given the existence of important and admirable instances
of truly intellectual contributions in our field,1 others besides me
must have dreary moments of detachment when the overall
contours of constitutional scholarship threaten to emerge. In such
moments, we notice that sometimes positions temporarily shift
but that they seldom change fundamentally; we see that critical
insights are often acknowledged but are then quickly forgotten or
ignored. In short, the same basic debates grind on and no
progress is made. No sooner is one brilliant theory fatally
undermined than another appears to take its place. One fervent
historical claim after another is shown to be simplistic, but the
enterprise of generating them goes on. An endless line of
ingenious doctrinal arguments are shown to be unsatisfactory,
but, like an empty train, they keep clanking down the track.
I Ira Rothberger Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado School of
Law. Paul Campos, Pierre Schlag, and Steven Smith contributed useful comments on
a draft of this paper.
1. For an example in the literature on federalism, see DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995).
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Thus, constitutional scholarship seems at its core to amount to
ceaseless assertion, the more brazen and improbable the better.
What is the purpose of this confident flow of words, this
relentless verbal energy? Its most obvious object is to
prevail-that is, to drown-out or obliterate or, at least, outlast.
To prevail, the basic rule seems to be: begin with the boldest
available position and then hold on. Seen in this light,
adversarial huffing and puffing is not a deficiency in an
otherwise intellectual enterprise; it is evidence that the purpose
of the enterprise was not intellectual to begin with.
This depiction no doubt seems excessively dismal, but one
purpose of this Essay is to suggest that the current debate on
federalism bears it out. The terms of that debate are,
appropriately enough, laid out in Charles Fried's 1995 Foreword
to the Harvard Law Review.2 This essay is titled Revolutions?,
and that one-word question itself conveys the structure of the
debate. While Fried concludes that the reasoning in the Court's
federalism decisions is too closely tied to past cases for the
adjective "revolutionary" to be apt, many others claim to see
radical potential in them. For instance, Kathleen Sullivan refers
to "a dramatic antifederalist revival."3 Laurence Tribe opines
that the Court is approaching "something radically different from
the modern understanding of the Constitution."4 Daniel Farber,
while trying hard not to overstate the stakes, unveils something
called the "New Federalism" that "broke out" as a movement
with general implications in 1995.' He attributes to some
members of this movement the view not only that states should
have attributes of sovereignty but that they are in some measure
"independent nations," a charge that is also made by some of the
justices on the Supreme Court.6 Indeed, Farber says that the
strongest version of the New Federalism holds that the
nationhood of states "is actually primary... more fundamental
2. Charles Fried, Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13 (1995).
3. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: United States Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80 (1995).
4. Linda Greenhouse, Focus on Federal Power, N.Y. TnIES, Ma 24, 1995, at Al.
5. Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the
New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REV. 615, 617, 622
(1995).
6. Id. at 625 (citing United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842,
1872-73 (1995) [hereinafter Term Limits)).
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to the constitutional scheme than the federal government." 7 An
excited Steven Calabresi thinks that United States v. Lopez is
"revolutionary,"s and even the unflappable Fried describes the
fact that four Justices signed the dissent in the Term Limits case
as "startling" and as "coming closest to revolutionary. 9
So, while conclusions differ, the debate is about whether the
Court's recent federalism decisions have radical or even
revolutionary potential. That the debate should have been
structured this way is a testament to audacity. After all, this
nation's two hundred year history can fairly be described as an
inexorable march of national power. Moreover, as I will try to
demonstrate, this triumph of centralization is so complete that
today, even in the legal academy, where unusual ideas might be
expected to germinate, there is no important radical or
revolutionary antifederalist challenge to our present federal
system. It is less surprising, but no less demonstrable, that there
is no such challenge from the most nationalized and remote of
institutions, the Supreme Court. There is, however, an influential
movement in the academy and on the federal bench in favor of
continuing the elimination of any remaining significant state
authority. As presently structured, the debate is designed not to
shed light on our constitutional system, but to assure that this
radically nationalist position will prevail. The boldest available
strategy is to turn the truth upside down by labeling as
constitutionally radical even moderate or marginal reservations
about the continuing trend toward centralization.
These claims require that I be able to identify what a
constitutionally "radical" or "revolutionary" antifederalist
program would look like. The meaning of these words is
dependent on some baseline, and I propose as a point of
comparison the program of the radical nationalists on the Court
and within the academy. I first describe this program and then I
compare it to current antifederalist proposals. Finally, I outline
what a radical antifederalist program might look like if there
were one.
7. Id. at 625.
8. Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers"- In
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 752 (1995).
9. Fried, supra note 2, at 14-15.
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II.
The most extreme version of radical nationalism proposes the
elimination of the states. This could involve replacing the states
with rationally drawn regional districts, a bright idea that is
nevertheless impractical because Article IV requires the consent
of a state's legislature before its territorial integrity is sacrificed.
A fallback proposal is to transform the existing states into
administrative units of the national government. If this
transformation were complete, it would run afoul of the
requirement that the United States guarantee to each state a
republican form of government. Perhaps because of the
constitutional impediments, there is no substantial academic
movement in favor of either method of eliminating the states.
Still, the idea in one form or another has had advocates as far
back as Alexander Hamilton," and an adventuresome modem
thinker occasionally mentions some variation." Such proposals
are important mainly in indicating how wide the range of
permissible discourse is among radical nationalists.
A somewhat more restrained version of extreme nationalism-
the version that Madison emphatically denied was contemplated
by the proposed Constitution' 2 -would allow states to exist, but
would completely subordinate them to the national government.
To use Madison's terms, this position would replace the "mixed
government" inherent in the Constitution of 1787 with a
"national" or "consolidated" government. Under a consolidated
system, state authority would be subordinated in three ways.
First, the legal authority of the Constitution (including, of course,
any amendments) would arise from the consent of the people of
the whole nation without any participation by the states. Second,
the operating institutions of the national government would not
be derived from or dependent on state institutions. Third, the
national government would have undefined regulatory power
over the people directly.
10. IV THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER H-IAILTON 211 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962). For
various interpretations of what he meant in calling for the elimination of state
sovereignty, see id. at 178, 187, 195, 202, and volume V, at 135, 138-39.
11. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 908-09 (1994) (arguing that states could be replaced
by "other subdivisions of the nation" but that the change would be disruptive).
12. THE FEDERAIST, No. 39 (James Madison).
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The first proposition-that the Constitution gained its legal
authority as an act of the undifferentiated people of the whole
nation-is simply at odds with the history of ratification and
with the ongoing practice of formal amendment. The proposed
Constitution was submitted for ratification to conventions
organized within each of the states, and the formal amendments
to that document have been submitted to state legislatures or (in
one instance) to state conventions. Nevertheless, the claim that
the authority of the Constitution arises from the consent of the
undifferentiated people has a long pedigree going back at least to
Justice Story. It is common in modern academic writings and
was embraced by Justice Kennedy in Term Limits.'3 Indeed, the
Madisonian position that the Constitution would gain legal force
through ratification by "[e]ach state.., as a sovereign body" '14 is
today decried by justices and commentators as dangerously
radical.
While this accusation is surely a sign of the audacity of today's
radical nationalists, of more practical importance is their
disapproval of the role of the states in the amendment process. It
might be supposed that since this role is specifically required by
Article V,' there would be no outright opposition to it or at
least that any outright opposition would itself be framed as a
proposed amendment under the procedures of Article V. One of
the most influential legal books of our time, however, argues that
the Constitution can and has been amended without any
participation by the states when in "constitutional moments" the
people of the nation engage in heightened deliberations. 6 While
this idea is taken very seriously, some scholars do reject the
thesis as radical. Nevertheless, the underlying impulse to
minimize the role of the states in the amendment process has
broad support. This support is partially discernible in the
common academic position against using the convention option of
Article V. It is safer, eminent constitutional scholars frequently
and earnestly tell the public, to wait for the national legislature
13. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1872 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). For an
example of academic endorsement see Farber, supra note 5, at 639.
14. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 12, at 244.
15. U.S. CONST. art. V states that "Congress ... shall propose Amendments to this
Constitution, or, ... shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments...
16. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
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to frame specific amendments than for two thirds of the state
legislatures to apply for a convention."
More generally, opposition to state involvement in the
amendment process is apparent in the enormous amounts of
judicial and academic effort that in recent decades have been
expended in trying to fashion justifications for innovative
interpretations of various constitutional rights. Given that some
of these rights have no specific textual bases, that some arguably
reverse intended constitutional meaning, and that 'some
nationalize issues (such as education and family law) that the
Court itself depicts as quintessential examples of matters left to
the states, it might be that their establishment should have been
left to constitutional amendment. Even if judicial interpretation
is viewed as a proper vehicle for instituting such basic changes,
there can be no doubt that it would also have been legitimate to
utilize the amendment process. Justices and scholars, however,
have relied almost exclusively on judicial interpretation and in so
doing have effectively created an enormously significant
alternative to either of the Article V amendment methods.18 The
sustained and aggressive use of this alternative has meant that
much of the fundamental law has been established without
participation by the states.
The second element of radical nationalism requires exclusion of
state institutions from the derivation or operation of national
institutions. Much of this exclusion has been accomplished by
constitutional amendment and by the relocation of what once
were assumed to be political questions to the jurisdiction of
federal courts. These massive changes, which include, for
example, the exclusion of state legislatures from the selection of
senators and the relocation of ultimate responsibility for electoral
reapportionment decisions in the federal courts, are not enough
for radical nationalists. Highly respected constitutional scholars
also rail against the electoral college and, more importantly,
want to eliminate the equal representation of each state in the Senate. 9
17. See, e.g., Arthur J. Goldberg, The Proposed Constitutional Convention, 11
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1983); Laurence H. Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting
Congress to Call a Constitutional Convention to Propose a Balanced Budget
Amendment, 10 PAc. L.J. 627 (1979).
18. For a straightforward acknowledgment that interpretation has been used as a
substitute for amendment, see Cass R. Sunstein, Making Amends, NEW REPULUC,
Mar. 3, 1997, at 38.
19. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Constitutional Accident Waiting to Happen, 12 CONST.
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Under Article V, the elimination of equal representation in the
Senate cannot be accomplished without the consent of every
state. This might seem to be an insurmountable obstacle, but the
ceaseless urge toward consolidated government is not to be
deterred. While the role of the states in choosing national
representatives cannot be eliminated, nationalists can attempt to
reduce it to a formality. A majority of the Supreme Court has
repeatedly and authoritatively asserted that representatives to
the national legislature "owe their allegiance to the people, and
not the States."" Senators "become, when elected, servants of
the people of the United States."21 Thus, although presumably
the framers made equal representation in the Senate a virtually
unamendable part of the Constitution for some serious reason,
radical nationalism posits that senators are to serve only the
national interest and assumes that this interest is definable
without reference to state interests. As legally improbable as this
position may be, modern consolidationists not only assert it but,
characteristically, describe those who disagree as dangerously
radical. The Court's claim that national representatives should
serve only the national interest cannot, of course, displace
political realities, but it can reinforce more general psychological
and cultural influences that encourage members of Congress to
cut their state-based roots as they live and work in Washington.
The Court's impact on the political culture has undermined
state influence over national institutions in another and even
more fundamental way. Since Marbury,' the Court has insisted
that the federal judiciary is the authentic voice of "the people"
who enacted and amended the Constitution.' In this century,
the national judiciary has emerged in the public's understanding
as the pre-eminent enforcer of limitations on the national
government. In theory, if not in operation, judicial review has
replaced political pressure from the states as the primary check
on federal overreaching. In the process, state-based political
activity expressing disagreement with the constitutional claims of
COlMMNTARY 143 (1995); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The One Senator, One Vote
Clause, id. at 159; Suzanna Sherry, Our Unconstitutional Senate, id at 213.
20. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1855 (1995).
21. Id, at 1871.
22. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803).
23. See CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE
RULE OF LAW 126 (1996).
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national institutions has been burdened by an extra measure of
perceived illegitimacy.'
The third element of a fully nationalized government,
according to Madison, is the generalized authority to regulate the
conduct of the people. This element requires no extended
discussion. That the central government's regulatory power is
effectively unlimited was conventional academic wisdom until
Lopez,' and calls for a return to this state of affairs are
frequent and vociferous."
Let me briefly recapitulate: Madison (and other proponents of
the proposed Constitution) specifically and unequivocally denied
that the new system would create either a confederated or a
consolidated government. These arguments (not to mention the
plainest possible constitutional text and enduring political
practices) indicate that ours is a mixed form of government.
Nevertheless, radical nationalists in the academy and on the
Court insistently push for the central government to have, in
effect if not in form, all the elements of an unmixed system. It
would, of course, be one thing for these strong nationalists to
acknowledge that our present government is and was meant to
be mixed and then to argue that a consolidated system would be
an improvement. But, instead, they usually insist that a
consolidated national government is what our present
Constitution creates.
What is more difficult to convey is the tenor of many of the
arguments made on behalf of an unmixed national system. As a
convenient illustration, consider an essay by the respected
scholar Daniel Farber." This article, The Constitution's
Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the New Federalism and the
Original Understanding, is by current standards serious and
moderate. Farber's argument is that George Washington's letter
to Congress on behalf of the Constitutional Convention
demonstrates several important aspects of intended
constitutional meaning.
Farber claims that Washington's letter demonstrates that the
Constitution was to gain its authority from the whole people, not
24. See ROBERT F. NAGEL, JUDICIAL POWER AND AimcA CHARACTER: CENSORING
OURSELVES IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 61-80 (1994).
25. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
26. See, e.g., id. at 1651 (Souter, J., dissenting); Farber, supra note 5, at 642.
27. See Farber, supra note 5.
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the people in the states. He infers this in part from Washington's
references to "our country" and "our Union."' Since these words
seem to assume the existence of a country before ratification,
Farber concludes that Washington believed Americans were "in
some sense already one people."' A second point is that
Washington's letter "does not say a word about the importance of
maintaining the states as a check on the federal government."0
Although Farber uses the observation for a somewhat different
purpose, his interpretation is consistent with the familiar
consolidationist view that state institutions should not serve as a
constituent part of-and therefore not as a check on-national
institutions. The third argument made by Farber is that because
the letter does refer to "fully and effectively vesting" important
powers in the new government, the regulatory powers of
Congress were meant to be so large as to be capable of becoming
general in all practical effect. 1
In Farber's essay, then, can be seen all three elements of the
consolidationist position as defined by Madison. These elements
are asserted to be the law of the land simply because of
Washington's letter. Although the argument is made confidently,
a moment's reflection shows it to be as light as smoke. To begin
with, Washington's use of the word "our Union," while
interesting, could not have meant that a legitimate political
union already existed inasmuch as the announced purpose of the
new Constitution was to create such a union. Indeed, the purpose
of the letter was to introduce and recommend the instrument
that would accomplish this change. Moreover, supposing that a
unified nation somehow could have predated its own founding, it
would not necessarily follow that the people in that union were
organized independently of the states in which they lived. In fact,
whether that kind of unification was even created by the new
Constitution is today a controverted question. 2 Perhaps sensing
these kinds of difficulties, Farber shifts quickly (as if it were the
same point) to the much more realistic possibility that
Washington meant that Americans were "in some sense already
28. Id at 627-28.
29. I& at 638-39.
30. Id. at 644.
31. Id. at 640-42.
32. For a balanced discussion of the competing arguments, see SHAPIRO, supra note
1, at 14-26, 58-63.
1997] 993
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:985
one people." ' It does seem quite likely that before ratification
Americans could have had a sense of historical or cultural
identity or of some form of incipient political identity. (Indeed,
the government created by the Articles of Confederation was
sometimes referred to as a "union."') What Farber does not
explain is his conclusion that Americans were already one people
in the sense that they had authority to ratify a new constitution
independently of the sovereign will of the people within existing
states. If they had believed themselves to be one people in that
sense, presumably they would have attempted to ratify the
Constitution by a national convention. They did not do so;
moreover, even under the Constitution that "the people" were
establishing and Washington was introducing, a national
convention can be used to propose, but not to ratify,
constitutional text.'
Farber's essay sails briskly along, ignoring these and other
difficulties. The most general difficulty, however, is not ignored,
but it is not taken seriously either. All three of Farber's
arguments are obviously subject to the objection that
Washington's brief letter is neither the text of the Constitution
that was eventually ratified nor is it a faithful summation of the
rich historical record that exists concerning the intentions of the
framers and ratifiers. For instance, what justifies Farber's
conclusion that the failure to mention the role of states as checks
on the national government is significant-any more significant
than, say, Washington's failure to mention that the Constitution
did not contemplate a king? To know what to make of omissions
or of vague terminology like "fully vesting," it is necessary to
know something about the rest of the debate over ratification. Of
course, Farber knows this full well,36 and it is here that his
essay descends to the level of parlor game. To the presumably
conclusive objection that a single, brief letter is far too little to
resolve fundamental questions about intended constitutional
meaning, Farber asks us to "look at how conservative theorists
define the proper role of intent."" His analysis purports to show
33. Farber, supra note 5, at 639.
34. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUInON 26 (1990). In contrast, the Constitution itself in places refers to the
United States with the plural "them." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
35. U.S. CoNST. art. V.
36. See Farber, supra note 5, at 628-35.
37. Id- at 631.
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that these conservative theorists should, if they are consistent,
treat Washington's letter as the authoritative statement of
intended meaning.
Now, Farber may have check-mated Judge Easterbrook and
the other "conservative theorists" (although I somehow doubt it),
but he has not given any argument that would convince someone
who does not accept these conservatives' (putative) theory of
historical intent. And into the category of the unpersuaded would
have to go a good many of the strong nationalists who are
presumably eager to develop some real justification for their
consolidationist positions. In short, Farber's essay not only
contains much of the substance of the standard nationalist
argument, but also conveys the sense of audacity and brazenness
that tends to characterize conventional constitutional
scholarship. If the consolidationists are clever enough and daring
enough, their ideas, even if wrong, will be the last ones standing.
I do not want to leave the impression that strongly
nationalistic positions go so far as to favor formal consolidation.
Most proposals for further centralization stop short of that
extreme. They do go very far, however, in calling for effective
consolidation. For example, despite the general tendency in the
academy to support the institution of judicial review (and despite
the related but more specific tendency to criticize the political
question doctrine), a prize-winning book argues that the federal
judiciary should altogether drop any effort to protect the states
from federal over-reaching.' It is not at all uncommon to see
arguments to the effect that federalism serves no important
values or that it is entirely obsolescent.39 Even if states should
continue to exist, a standard academic position is that their
operations should be subject to direct national regulation.'
These positions are all radical in the sense that they assign little
or no value to a structural principle that was undeniably central
to the constitutional design and that continues to play an
important part in the regular operation of American governance.
38. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvIEw AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESs: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980).
39. Id; see also Rubin & Feeley, supra note 11.
40. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 5, at 643.
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III.
While, of course, by some measure there may today be a
radical antifederalist agenda, I think it is clear that there is no
antifederalist program equivalent to the radical nationalist
position that dominates the case law and the academy and is
taken for granted. As a preliminary matter, recall that it is at
least not entirely beyond the pale for nationalists on occasion to
consider abolishing the states outright. An equivalent
antifederalist discourse is imaginable. The corresponding
antifederalist proposal would be to abolish the national
government and return to the kind of confederation that preceded
unification. Such a return would involve abolishing the House of
Representatives, the Presidency, much of the Judicial Branch,
the Bill of Rights, national taxation, and all commerce clause
regulation. As far as I know, no one on the Court or in the
academy even mentions, much less supports, any of these
changes.
A more realistic possibility is that, just as modern nationalists
support all three elements of what Madison called consolidation,
modern antifederalists might support what he termed
confederation. Certainly, much of the outcry against the "new
federalism" asserts precisely that it favors replacing the present
system with a "league" or a "confederation of nations."4' At least
in Madisonian terms, this charge is false. In a confederation, the
unanimous consent of the states would be required for
constitutional amendment, each state would be required to have
equal representation in the House of Representatives as well as
in the Senate, and the national government could have no direct
regulatory authority at all. If any one of these proposals has been
made by a reputable scholar or jurist, I have not seen it. In
contrast to the fact that it is not uncommon to find writers like
Farber who matter-of-factly recommend all three elements of an
unmixed national government, I am confident that no serious
modern writer has proposed all three elements of confederation.
Of course, there might well be antifederalist proposals that are
radical even though they fall short of favoring formal
confederation. It might be, for instance, that in the same way
that many strong nationalists see virtually no value in residual
state sovereignty, some modern antifederalists may see no value
41. Id at 625, 638; Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1855 (1995).
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or almost no value in the national government. Merely stating
this possibility outright suggests its outlandish implausibility.
Needless to say, many antifederalists, including, for example,
Professor Fried and Justice Scalia, have written specifically and
sometimes movingly about the values of nationhood.' It is safe
to say that every significant antifederalist on or off the Court
understands the need for potent national powers like defense and
taxation. While Justice Thomas and Professor Epstein (among
others) have argued forcefully that national power must be
specifically authorized,' the various arguments for a restrictive
definition of "commerce" do not suggest that it was inappropriate
or unwise to authorize national power over that set of activities
conceded to constitute commerce among the states. Similarly, not
a word in the notorious Term Limits dissent implies that states
could impose any qualification for national representatives
specifically prohibited by either the Constitution or a federal
statute. In short, modern antifederalists are questioning how
much power the Constitution grants the national government,
not whether a national government serves vitally important
purposes.
Despite their occasionally loose rhetoric, in sober moments
strong nationalists might be inclined to admit all this and yet
still insist that the modem antifederalists are dangerously
radical. They could claim-indeed, some do claim-that the
antifederalist program is radical by a different measure
altogether. That is the measure of proposed deviation from the
status quo. Radical nationalism, by this argument, may be
constitutionally radical, but it is largely an accomplished fact.
The antifederalist agenda, conversely, may be legalistically
moderate, but it proposes very significant changes from what has
become the accepted norm.
In evaluating this claim, it is important to note that its
apparent empiricism is illusory. Suppose that in the past fifty
years the American government had gradually developed into a
presidential dictatorship. Under that circumstance, calls for a
42. Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 19,
22 (1982); Fried, supra note 2, at 13; see also Calabresi, supra note 8, at 780.
43. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1642-50 (1995); Richard A. Epstein,
The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1987); see also
Calabresi, supra note 8.
44. See, e.g., Rubin & Feeley, supra note 11, at 944-52.
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return to republican arrangements would entail very large
changes from the established norm. Presumably, however, such
calls could not be dismissed as radical for that reason. Whether a
large change in existing practices is "radical" or not must depend
in some degree on how far existing practices depart from legal
and moral norms. To the extent that the empirical claim
assumes, as a benchmark, the existence of a consolidated
government, that claim evades or begs the question whether
consolidation is constitutionally radical.
But even on its own terms the empirical claim is doubtful
because it depends on exaggerating the degree to which our
political practices are nationalized. Although strong nationalists
see states as anachronisms and favor a program of consolidation,
state governments continue to exist and to exhibit important
elements of sovereignty. They organize governance at the local
level, they regulate the lives of their citizens, they participate in
the amendment process, and so on. It is true that by and large
people have come to expect the national government to regulate
without conceptually-based limitations, but they still assume that
much of this national power will be employed against a
background of normal and pervasive state regulation. Certainly it
would be a major jolt to established expectations if the national
government were to displace (rather than supplement) state
institutions in the routine operation of public schools or criminal
law enforcement. In some measure, then, the antifederalist
program seeks only to preserve the status quo or to change it at
the margin. Consider the three cases that are the most important
constituents of that program:
(1) Despite the furor over the dissent in Term Limits, the most
that can be said with any certainty about its implications is that
those who joined it would approve of other state-imposed
qualifications.' This power, however, would be limited by
explicit constitutional limitations, such as the equal protection
clause, and also, presumably by the power of Congress under
Article I, Section 4 to override state decisions." Moreover, the
significant role the states generally play in operating and
regulating national elections is not foreign to our experience. In
fact, as the dissent points out, before 1913 when the Seventeenth
45. See Robert F. Nagel, The Term Limits Dissent: What Nerve, 38 AlIZ. L. REV.
843, 845-47 (1996).
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
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Amendment was enacted, state legislatures had "virtually
unfettered" discretion to adopt rules narrowing their choice for
United States senator.47 Perhaps most fundamentally, even
today, after the Term Limits decision, the voters in every state
have, as a practical matter, the power to decide what should be a
disqualification for national office, even including insufficient
commitment to that state's interests. If the voters in the states
want a "patchwork" of parochial representatives, they can-and
do--elect such people now. If they want representatives who look
to "the national interest," nothing in the dissent could prevent
them from realizing that either.
(2) On the basis of both the Term Limits dissent and the
majority opinion in Lopez" it is obviously fair to conclude that
some important antifederalists generally favor construing
enumerated national powers restrictively. Given the number and
range of existing statutes based on the commerce power,
theoretically this position could eventually result in a significant
change in the status quo. By now, however, every first-year law
student knows the various ways the Lopez majority indicated
that Congress can get around its ruling. True, Justice Thomas'
concurring opinion proposes a more sweeping reappraisal of
modern commerce clause decisions based on a historical and
narrow understanding of the word "commerce.' 9 However,
Thomas denies that his attack on the "substantial effect" test
should lead to a wholesale repudiation of the modem cases. 0
Naturally, skeptics might wonder about this reassurance. But,
even the narrowest meaning of "commerce" extends to
commercial sales and transportation undertaken in connection
with those sales. Under this definition, perhaps Congress could
not regulate "local" activities, like manufacturing, directly, but I
can see no convincing reason why it could not regulate the same
subjects indirectly by prohibiting interstate shipment of goods
produced in violation of whatever standards Congress imposed.
As Epstein notes, various doctrinal limits on this indirect form of
national regulation are conceivable, but they require
47. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1893 (1995).
48. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1624.
49. IdM at 1642-51. Judge Thomas' concurring opinion is supported by noted
scholars. See RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987); Epstein,
supra note 43.
50. Lopez, 115 S. Ct at 1650-5L
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justifications that go well beyond a historical understanding of
the commerce clause.5 These supplementary doctrines, which
include judicial investigation of congressional motives, have been
firmly repudiated by the Court and are not even mentioned in
Thomas' concurrence. In short, standing alone, the most that
even Thomas' definition of commerce would accomplish would be
to force increased reliance on what is already one of the major
techniques for the exercise of the commerce power. More frequent
resort to the devise of regulating goods at the point of inter-state
shipment would hardly qualify as a radical change from present
practices.
(3) In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,52 the Court said
that the commerce power does not authorize Congress to subject
nonconsenting states to suits by private parties. Several
commentators have pointed out, however, that the decision does
not affect Ex parte Young," so federal laws can still be enforced
prospectively against states in federal court by the expedient of
naming as defendants the appropriate state officers rather than
the state itself. As Henry Monaghan concluded, Seminole Tribe
"will prevent a federal forum only in rare situations... in which
Congress has provided a remedy against the state but not
against the state officials."' Only in that situation would
enforcement of a federal rule be relegated to state courts.
Even if none of the three major "antifederalist" opinions
threatens any important change in the status quo, it might be
that an important antifederalist movement exists that is
energetically engaged in fomenting ideas that will eventually
lead to such changes. I cannot entirely disprove this claim, but I
can indicate why it is unlikely.
When antifederalists propose ideas that might have potential
for radical decentralization, in significant instances they
specifically argue against any real-world change. For example, in
an article arguing flatly for the proposition that "the post-New
Deal administrative state is unconstitutional,"55 Gary Lawson
asserts just as flatly that the administrative state "has been
51. Epstein, supra note 43, at 1421-32.
52. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
53. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
54. Henry Paul Monaghan, Comment, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception,' 110
HARv. L. REV. 102, 132 (1996).




accepted by all institutions of government and by the
electorate."56 He devotes the concluding section of his essay to a
brooding meditation on the possible responses to "the enormous
gap between constitutional meaning and constitutional
practice."" The option he seems to favor is to accept the modern
state as a fact and to reconsider whether a constitutionalism of
historically intended meaning should carry any normative
weight.
In a similar vein, H. Jefferson Powell offers an extensive
exploration and partial defense of the immunity for state decision
making processes created in New York v. United States." As one
aspect of his analysis, Powell hits upon the kind of insight that
often causes constitutional scholars to embark on excited flights
of doctrinal prescription. He notes that the New York opinion is
inconsistent with Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. 9 That is, he finds a
plausible modern argument for immunizing the decisions of state
supreme courts from compelled entry of judgment by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Now, there is an idea with the potential for
radical alteration in the status quo. Moreover, Powell is
respectful of the original arguments against Hunter's Lessee, and
he is sympathetic to the New York Court's intuitions about
federalism. He does not, however, propose using New York as a
fulcrum to dislodge the accepted practice of the Supreme Court
commandeering state courts to implement its judgments. On the
contrary, he observes that Justice O'Connor, the author of New
York, "assuredly does not question the holding of Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee," so Marshall's opinion "must raise questions
about the coherence of Justice O'Connor's federalism.' He goes
on to try to rescue a modest version of O'Connor's federalism-a
version that does not challenge "the substantive scope of federal
power"' and does not succumb "to the impractical desire to
repudiate the modern federal government.
When modern antifederalist scholars draw back from or
repudiate altogether the operational implications of their
56. Id. at 1254.
57. Id. at 1232.
58. H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV.
633 (1993); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
59. Powell, supra note 58, at 678-81.
60. Id. at 677.
61. Id. at 687.
62. Id. at 689.
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arguments, they may be exhibiting nothing more than a
begrudging recognition of political reality. But they may also be
exhibiting the virtually universal consensus that I referred to
earlier; that is, they may be demonstrating their own recognition
that a strong national government is morally and politically
essential.
Participation in such a consensus would also explain why so
many proposals for decentralization are designed, both in their
content and their style, to preserve national power. Two leading
defenses of the limited state immunity created by United States
v. New York, for example, emphasize that process immunities can
protect democratic values without diminishing the power of the
national government to regulate any aspect of private
behavior.' Moreover, several of the commentaries on the re-
emergence in Lopez of a distinctive legal concept of commerce
emphasize didactic, rather than operational, objectives, as does
Monaghan's effort to explain Seminole Tribe." Even where
Lopez is defended on instrumental, doctrinal grounds, the
emphasis often is not on the development of rules that would
have far-reaching consequences.s For instance, Deborah Merritt
defends a "fuzzy" method of distinguishing "commerceP from
other activities and praises the Court for leaving prior Commerce
Clause decisions untouched.' Finally, Lynn Baker has recently
mounted an extended argument for limiting Congress's spending
power in light of Lopez, but her rather conventionally doctrinal
proposal is carefully hedged with important presumptions added
for the specific purpose of "preserving for Congress a power to
spend that is greater than its power to regulate the states
directly."
6 7
All of these examples of prescriptive modesty might, I suppose,
be dismissed as crafty but insincere reassurances. But if modem
antifederalists covertly favored dramatic alterations in present
63. Deborah J. Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the
Future, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1563, 1576-77, 1584 (1994); see also ROBERT F. NAGEL,
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
76 (1989); Powell, supra note 58, at 687.
64. See, e.g., Deborah J. Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674 (1995); cf
Monaghan, supra note 54, at 121; NAGEL, supra note 63, at 81-83.
65. See Epstein, supra note 43 and Calabresi, supra note 8, for exceptions.
66. Merritt, supra note 63, at 750.




political practices, presumably they would not rely on reform
through the very national institutions that can be expected to
protect the national government from radical disempowerment.
Most antifederalist proposals, however, do rely on national
decisionmakers. Robert Bork, for instance, advances a broad-
gauged attack on federal judicial power, but his radical solution
is to amend the Constitution to allow the national legislature to
override Supreme Court decisions.' This is a prescription for
change, but not for change that radically redistributes power to
the states. (Indeed, Bork's proposal would authorize Congress to
reverse decisions of state supreme courts.) Similarly, the various
commentators who recommend restrictive definitions of
"commerce among the states" would trust the national courts to
see that these definitions are not evaded or subverted. John Yoo's
argument that institutional injunctions lie outside the meaning
of "judicial power" in Article IT relies for implementation partly
on the Court's sense of self-restraint and partly on Congress.69
Stephen Gardbaum's interesting idea that federalism has
principled application even in the area of concurrent powers is to
be implemented by the Supreme Court "policing Congress's
deliberative processes."' °
Intellectual fixation on nationally-imposed solutions to
problems of federal over-reaching is not, of course, surprising or
necessarily inappropriate. But it does emphasize the extent to
which even proposals for significant change assume the
legitimacy and importance of national institutions.
Modern antifederalists do not want to abolish the national
government. They do not argue for confederation. By and large,
they do not even argue for significant changes in current political
practices. The most that can be said is that they do not accept
the view that states are of no value in our political system.
Therefore, these modern antifederalists want to preserve and
strengthen elements of our existing mixed system. In short,
modern antifederalism is radical only on the assumption that the
positions taken by modern consolidationists are noncontroversial
68. ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERiCAN DECLINE 117 (1996).
69. John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1121 (1996).
70. Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX L. REV. 795,
799 (1996).
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both descriptively and normatively. All of which raises the
question: given the modest and equivocal nature of
antifederalists' objectives, what would a radical antifederalist
agenda, if one existed, look like?
IV.
It is possible-but fanciful-to imagine a strong antifederalist
movement mirroring the tactics of the modem consolidationist
movement. Radical antifederalists might exploit all available
historical and philosophical materials to urge that state
sovereignty is not simply useful or even important but that it is
absolutely foundational to all other constitutional values.7
Building on Epstein's arguments about the reach of the
Commerce Clause, they could offer one imaginative doctrinal
formulation after another in a short-run effort to prevent all
evasions of conceptualistic limitations on the enumerated powers.
They could argue audaciously and relentlessly for reading the
Necessary and Proper Clause as a mere truism that adds nothing
to Congress's authority. They could insist that the inner logic of
United States v. New York requires that it be extended to protect
the integrity of state judicial proceedings from the United States
Supreme Court. Arguing against empty formalism and from the
assumption that the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment must
adapt in response to unforeseen modern conditions, they could
seek to reverse Ex parte Young. They could not only propound
but also seek to implement a definition of "the judicial power"
under Article Ill that is as restrictive as the current judicial role
is expansive. Antifederalists could, in short, ape strong
nationalists by exploiting all the wide opportunities afforded by
the conventions of constitutional interpretation.
As unlikely (or unattractive) as this version of modern
antifederalism might be, it would in some respects not really be
radical. It would depend almost entirely on the exercise of
national judicial power.72 A more truly radical program would
71. One scholar does argue that federalism is more important than other values
protected by the Court. Calabresi, supra note 8, at 756-79. Compare id. with Michael
W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484
(1987) and NAGEL, supra note 63, at 73-74.
72. Even one of the most forceful modern antifederalists sees this as an advantage




aim at making national power dependent on state institutions
rather than the reverse. This version of antifederalism might, for
instance, support repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment so that
the Senate would again be directly responsive to state
legislatures. It could also favor repealing those parts of Article V
that give Congress a role in the amendment process, and it would
propose replacing them with populist or state-based
procedures.73 It could support an amendment allowing state
legislatures to overturn certain classes of Supreme Court
decisions. These kinds of ideas are certainly radical in one sense,
but in another they are not. Unlike, for instance, the nationalists'
use of expansive judicial review to supplement or replace the
provisions of Article V, these proposals all docilely accept the
amendment process, a process that is itself controlled by national
institutions.
This suggests that, like strong nationalists, antifederalists
could rely on a strategy of directing inventive and insistent
constitutional arguments at institutions that have a stake in
accepting those arguments. Radical antifederalism might,
therefore, turn to some form of nullification or interposition.
Insofar as nullification entails outright defiance of national
authority, it would certainly be radical but it would not be
modern antifederalism. In the extremely unlikely event that
states prevailed against national authority, the "people in the
states" would have become sovereign over the Constitution that
they ratified. Just as judicial review effectively replaces the
sovereignty of the people with judicial discretion, defiant
nullification replaces the foundational document with local
political judgment. In seeking to mimic the tactics of the
consolidationists, antifederalists would have transformed
themselves into confederationists.
Interposition, however, does not necessarily require outright
defiance. Variations of this doctrine can be and have been used
simply as. devices for registering official disagreement with
constitutional claims made by the national government.74 At
least in combination with other forms of pressure, this tactic
73. For one such proposal, see WILLIAM J. QUIK & R. RANDALL BIEDWELL,
JUDICIAL DICTATORsHnP 52 (1995).
74. See Wayne D. Moore, Reconceiving Interpretive Autonomy: Insights from the
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 315 (1994).
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seems to me to hold some radical potential and also to be
consistent with the principles of modern antifederalism.
Using interposition for communicative and organizational
purposes does not presume ultimate sovereignty for the states,
but can it be expected to induce any significant change in the
status quo? After all, even the Virginia and Kentucky Resolves
opened debate on the Alien and Sedition Acts only to produce
support for the nationalist position.75 Moreover, as the history of
abortion regulation between Roe and Casey demonstrates, states
already "talk back" to the national government through various
official actions that effectively challenge national policy. Even
when they are partially effective, however, such recalcitrant
actions are typically framed and understood as policy
disagreements. Since the Court has pre-empted the high ground
of constitutional interpretation, dissent based on moral or
pragmatic considerations is widely viewed as improper. 6 A
certain kind of radical potential, therefore, could arise from the
possibility that responsible and sustained use of the
communicative versions of interposition might help to persuade
the public that the "people in the states" do have a legitimate
role in enforcing constitutional limits.
This kind of change in public understanding and attitude could
have far-reaching practical ramifications. While it is common to
complain that the habitual, inexorable resort to national
solutions reduces the moral status of state and local
governments, it is also true that nationalization is a result of this
loss of moral status. States still exist and function in significant
ways, but they do so without any strong underpinnings of
political morality. Consolidationists are right in claiming that, as
a people, we have largely lost any sense for why limited state
sovereignty might be, not just a familiar, but a desirable state of
affairs. Hence the existence of independent power centers within
the states can provide only a weak drag on regulatory
centralization. If states were self-consciously to take on the role
of helping to enforce the Constitution, they might earn some of
the stature presently monopolized by the judiciary. They might,
that is, provide the public with some affirmative reason-beyond
occasional self-interest-for loyalty to state institutions.
75. Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1519 (1994).
76. See NAGEL, supra note 24.
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At least in contrast to the kinds of specific and limited changes
that might be expected from, say, a few judicial decisions
extending United States v. Lopez, an increase in the moral status
of state institutions would amount to a cultural change to which
the word "radical" might actually apply. The federal system of
government that we have today is defined and maintained by
thousands of decisions that result every day from the
understandings and relationships existing within legislatures,
government bureaucracies, and political parties.' To influence
the attitudes that underlie these decisions could have pervasive
and significant effects.
If the states were established as limited but legitimate
contributors to the process of determining constitutional
meaning, renewed realism and maturity could be injected into
American political thought. Institutionalized competition to
protect constitutional values could promote the recognition that
here sovereignty resides in a complex, indeterminate process, not
in a king or a court. It could vividly hold out the paradoxical idea
that the national interest cannot be determined wholly apart
from local interests. It could instill a deeper understa _m-ig that
there are degrees of political unity and limits on loyalty. All of
which is to say that in practice a vibrant form of federalism
requires and might promote a capacity for independence, for
ambivalence, for incompleteness, and for qualification.78 Thus, a
radical effort to reinvigorate the moral status of the states would
have as one of its ambitious purposes the promotion of certain
attractive but precarious intellectual qualities.
The intellectual climate that exists in any polity is, of course,
the product of history, and it can be doubted that this climate
would be altered much, even by such a significant change as the
re-introduction of a responsible version of interposition.
Moreover, it can be doubted that the doctrine of interposition
could be re-introduced in any responsible form under current
conditions. It is certain that these matters are mostly out of the
hands of law professors.
Nevertheless, what ought not to be unrealistic is that those
who study the constitutional system be willing to consider the
idea of using interposition to reinvigorate the federal
77. See Kramer, supra note 75.
78. See Wilfred M. McClay, The Soul of Man Under Federalism, FIRST THINGS 12
(June/July 1996).
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system-that they not dismiss this idea merely because it is in
some sense "radical," that they not muster their formidable
rhetorical forces to shut down thought, that they not once again
roll out consolidationist doctrine to mark the limit of permissible
discussion. While it may well be too much to hope that the
political culture as a whole possess the intellectualism demanded
by a federal system, it ought not to be too much to ask it of the
constitutional law establishment. Then again, perhaps it is the
other way around.
